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The private security industry in Antwerp
(1907-1934)
A historical-criminological analysis of its modus operandi
and growth
Pieter Leloup1
Cet article présente une analyse de  l’industrie de la sécurité privée 
à Anvers entre 1907 et 1934, au point de vue de son développement, de sa 
structure et de ses activités.  L’émergence  d’une forme marchande de police est 
replacée dans le  contexte de développements politiques, socio-économiques et 
criminologiques en Belgique. Nous nous attardons particulièrement sur deux 
 compagnies qui ont jeté les bases de  l’industrie belge moderne de la sécurité, 
Waak en Sluit et Garde Maritime & Commerciale, tout en présentant certaines 
 comparaisons avec  d’autres services de police privés (inter)nationaux.
In this  contribution the nature of the private security industry in the city 
of Antwerp between 1907 and 1934 will be analysed, with regards to its 
growth, structure and activities. This emergence of profit-oriented policing 
is further researched within the framework of political, socio-economic and 
criminological developments in Belgium. Our focus rests mostly upon two 
 companies which formed the foundation of the modern security industry in 
Belgium, Waak en Sluit and the Garde Maritime & Commerciale, although 
they are to a certain extent  compared to other (inter)national private policing 
services. 
INTRODUCTION
Although academic interest in private security and policing has increased significantly in the last few decades, it is only recently that  consensus has 
evolved on the changes that policing and crime  control in Western industrialised 
countries have gone through.2 Most scholars attribute significant shifts in the 
delivery, practice and orientation of policing and crime  control to the development 
of new professions in security, and to the substantial expansion of private sector 
security services in particular.3 In what today is a burgeoning security industry, the 
1 Pieter Leloup has a Master in Criminological Sciences (2012) as well as a Master in History (2009) 
both from the University of Ghent. He is currently preparing his PhD thesis at the University of Brus-
sels working on the history of the private security industry in Belgium, c. 1907 to the present. He has 
published the monograph Private en  commerciële veiligheidszorg in België. Een historisch-criminol-
ogisch onderzoek (1870-1934) (Antwerpen, Maklu Uitgeverij, 2014) and together with Xavier Rou-
seaux and Antoon Vrints he has co-authored the article ‘Banditry in occupied and liberated Belgium, 
1914–1921 : Social practises and state reactions’, Social History (2014, 39, 1, pp. 83-105).
2 Jones, Newburn (2002).
3 Hoste, Enhus (2004) ; Cools, Verbeiren (2004) ; McLaughlin (2007).
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tens of thousands of private security personnel greatly outnumber police forces in 
several Western nations4, and private agencies have become important suppliers of 
visible surveillance, order maintenance, investigation and information-brokering.5 
Some interpret these changes by claiming that we are entering a new era in which 
one system, that of public policing, has ended and another has taken its place.6 
These developments are undeniable and are quite obviously present in Belgium as 
well. The interpretation, however, should be  considered with some caution. Do the 
changes in  contemporary crime  control actually  constitute a radical – or at least a 
substantial – break with the past, and is the analysis, largely based on Anglo-Saxon 
developments, universally applicable to the Belgian situation ? Setting these changes 
in a historical perspective and teasing out enduring motifs in crime  control might 
reveal a longer-term pattern of multiple policing providers and security markets, as 
well as greater intertwinement of public and private policing than acknowledged by 
those proclaiming the arrival of a new epoch.7
While at an international level the history of private policing has been the 
subject of a growing amount of criminological and historical studies,8 there is 
no  comprehensive research on the topic in Belgium. This is surprising, given the 
longstanding debates in Belgium on reassigning core police tasks to the security 
industry, the so-called ‘Kerntakendebat’, and the widely discussed erosion of the 
boundaries between the public and private sector. This article attempts to shed light 
on the growth, activities and organisation of the private security industry in Belgium 
in general, and the city of Antwerp in particular, between 1907 and 1934. The aim 
is, on the one hand, to analyse the nature of the security industry as it was in the first 
third of the twentieth century and, on the other hand, to understand the underlying 
historical mechanisms that shaped the development of this security market. As the 
following sections on the Antwerp security industry will make clear, we might need 
to reframe our understanding of the  contemporary trend towards privatising policing, 
since these transformations are the outcome of a longer historical process that began 
in the early twentieth century. In this respect Antwerp is an interesting case, being 
the city where  Belgium’s first official private security  company in was established in 
1907.9 We have selected the year 1934 as the finishing point for this study, as this is 
the year the Belgian government adopted its first legislation on private security, the 
29 July 1934 ‘Law Prohibiting Private Militias’. 
In general the private security sector can be divided into two branches : the 
provision of security-guard services and private detective agencies. Though research 
on private investigation shows it played a significant role in the development of 
the modern and pre-modern Anglo-Saxon criminal justice and police system,10 in 
Belgium, however, private detective agencies only had a marginal influence on this 
overall historical development.11 As a result, we will be focusing exclusively on 
 4 Button (2002).
 5 McLaughlin (2007).
 6 Bayley, Shearing (1996).
 7 Zedner (2006).
 8 Johnston (1992) ; Kalifa (2000) ; Van Steden (2007) ; Williams (2008) ; Godfrey, Cox (2013).
 9 Leloup (2014).
10 Johnston (1992, pp. 9-12) ; Beattie (2012).
11 Van Outrive et al. (1992) ; Denys (2010).
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the security industry and its  companies, employing privately paid watchmen and 
mobile guards. Through intensive archival research, we have  come up with new 
insights shedding light on the growth and activities of the first private-sector security 
 companies, Waak en Sluit and the Garde Maritime & Commerciale. Given the lack 
of historical-criminological research on the private security industry in Belgium, our 
case study is only a first exploration of the dynamics of its historical development 
and its activities and modus operandi. However, by offering certain insights into the 
early twentieth century roots of Belgian private security, its practices and its position 
in security and policing networks, this analysis can  contribute to ongoing debates in 
criminology and history about shifts in crime  control, private and public policing 
relations, plural policing practices and about criticism of the state monopolisation 
thesis. 
In this article, we therefore begin by presenting the reader with an introduction 
to and discussion of some of the key  concepts and claims in this area of research, 
before demonstrating the need for historical reflection. We then move on to explore 
the private security industry in Antwerp, describing its origins and examining in 
detail the structure and activities of two of the first private security  companies in 
Belgium. In the final sections, we attempt to outline some fundamental political, 
socio-economic and socio- cultural trends, in which issues related to crime and crime 
 control have enhanced privatised responses to security threats. Also, we investigate 
the interface between the state police and the private  companies discussed, 
questioning in particular the  latter’s policing powers. We wind up with a general 
 conclusion.
THE  CONCEPT OF PRIVATE SECURITY
Even today, while in several Western industrialised societies private security 
guards outnumber their public colleagues, the  concept of privatised security still 
arouses mixed emotions.12 While the dichotomous thinking in terms of ‘public’ and 
‘private’ has repeatedly been criticized, the analytical classification is still widely 
used in the majority of scientific works on security provision and policing. The notion 
of ‘public’ refers to the tax-financed provision of collective services by the state. In 
the private sector, on the other hand, profit-seeking enterprises target a select group 
of paying customers.13 In summary, private security refers to “the process whereby 
individuals and agencies (be they governments or corporations) make use of the age-
old prerogative of self-help to protect their belongings and persons”14.
If the existing literature on security and policing teaches us one thing, it is that the 
history of – and interface between – public and private policing are quite  complex, 
and repeatedly debated in both academic and political circles.15 Looking for instance 
at works of Hobbes, Smith and Marx, security and policing were seen primarily as 
12 See e.g. Loader (1997) ; Neocleous (2007).
13 For an overview of these debates see for example Johnston (1992) ; Jones, Newburn (1998) ; Button 
(2002).
14 Shearing, Stenning (1982, p. 3).
15 Johnston (1992) ; Sklansky (1998).
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examples of public welfare.16 Yet, throughout history security provision was never 
monopolized by the state alone, even in the supposed heydays of public policing, 
characterised by the institutionalisation of the modern police apparatus in the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Before this, there was little distinction between 
public and private forms of policing.17 As part of the then state-building process and 
subsequent professionalization of the governance of crime  control, a public-private 
discrepancy gained greater relevance in the field of maintaining public order.18 This 
transition towards more state- controlled law enforcement strengthened the incorrect 
assumption of an “unprecedented public dominion over crime  control”, as Churchill 
argues.19 Actually, a wide and  complex range of public and private bodies dealing 
with crime existed throughout the nineteenth century, countering an often assumed 
central  conception in criminal justice history : the state monopolisation thesis.
Even so, a number of leading criminologists tend to interpret the recent 
growth of the private security sector as a radical shift from a public to a plural 
policing model.20 An ingrained ahistorical approach to criminological studies on 
private policing explains why many  contemporary insights on the subject fail to 
provide a theoretical and empirical long-term explanatory basis. In this respect, 
the  contemporary shift in crime  control towards privatisation is often primarily 
interpreted as a relatively recent development, signalling further decline in state 
 control. Thus, although frequently seen differently, it is rather the ‘new police’ and 
“not the modern phenomena of agencies within the private security sector that are 
out of step with the historical lineage of policing forms”.21 To a certain degree, 
the lack of empirical data and material on the subject might be responsible. In our 
case, for example, no direct archival records were found on either Waak en Sluit 
or Garde Maritime & Commerciale. Painstaking archival research in organisations 
indirectly involved in (private) policing and security – e.g. the Chamber of 
Commerce, maritime and business interest parties, the Antwerp authorities, etc. 
– was needed to collect and analyse data on private security  companies. Despite 
this inevitable methodological issue, this  contribution challenges the alleged 
historical discontinuity in private initiatives within the sector of surveillance and 
the protection of goods and people. In addition, we reveal the explanatory value 
of the historical perspective for providing a better understanding of present-day 
policing governance. In this respect, we argue that overlooking historical patterns 
of policing generates, and even more importantly, reaffirms the above-mentioned 
misconceptions of present-day shifts in security provision and the perceived myth 
of the  state’s policing monopoly. To do this, we will examine the actual extent to 
which private security agencies have operated alongside the regular police since the 
early twentieth century in Belgium.
16 Jones, Newburn (1999, pp. 33-34).
17 Williams (2008).
18 Shearing, Stenning (1987, p. 12).
19 Churchill (2014).
20 See e.g. Bayley, Shearing (1996).
21 South (1987, p. 72).
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PRIVATE SECURITY IN ANTWERP (1907-1934) : SECURITY
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT IN ANTWERP 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the Belgian city of Antwerp, capital 
of the same-named province, had almost 300,000 inhabitants. Parallel to its 
 considerable demographic growth – since 1850 the number of inhabitants had 
nearly tripled – and the  city’s spatial expansion, industrial, business and maritime 
activities increased significantly, making it one of the  country’s largest urbanised 
and industrialised cities.22 The specific nature of the city and its port located on the 
banks of the Scheldt – in terms of infrastructural size the second largest in the world 
around 1900 – resulted in a  complex set of dynamics and developments on multiple 
levels : social, political, economic,  cultural and criminological. But while similar 
socio- cultural transformations affected many modern Western European cities 
between 1880 and 1914 – the steady rise of a wealthy middle class, a flourishing 
nightlife, the growth of  conspicuous  consumption etc., the proximity of a port also 
led to particular changes in cities like Antwerp. Immigration and the presence of vast 
numbers of low-paid dockworkers promoted the rise of specific urban districts and 
ghettos.23 Secondly, as we will show below, the port itself produced vast flows of 
people and goods, and  consequently profitable criminal opportunities. And thirdly, 
politics and other societal domains were to a large extent dominated by a network of 
elite merchants with extensive business links to the port of Antwerp.24
These specific urban and industrial characteristics and developments forced 
the Antwerp authorities to develop hands-on strategies for social  control and order 
maintenance throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. In doing so, they 
were mainly dependent on municipal police forces and the Antwerp ‘Burgerwacht’ 
or civic guard. Since the creation of the Belgian state this force was publically and 
politically  controversial and not very well trained. It proved ineffective, and, until the 
end of the First World War, was mostly called upon to put down organised strikes in 
the city and port of Antwerp.25 During that time, perceptions of crime and its  control 
were changing significantly, in line with the transforming nature of society in political 
and socio-economic  conditions. In an era of  considerable industrial development, 
a rapidly increasing working class fuelled moral panic among members of the 
social elite, bringing about a tendency towards morally and physically  controlling 
the ‘classes dangereuses’ such as beggars, prostitutes, alcoholics and foreigners26. 
In response to the needs of a modern and rapidly changing political, social and 
economic environment, the Belgian government favoured the idea of a professional 
national police force. As far as the local police forces in such larger cities as Antwerp 
were  concerned, efforts were made to specialise, unify and modernise them.
Until then, the local city police had suffered from serious qualitative and 
quantitative shortcomings, which forced them, among other things, to cooperate with 
private and hybrid auxiliary policing bodies.27 In order, for example, to supervise 
22 Leysen, Boehme (2009, p. 10).
23 Vanfraechem (2008, p. 20).
24 Loyen (2008a, p. 11).
25 Leloup (2014, p. 68).
26 Deneckere (2006, pp. 123-124).
27 Keunings (1988) ; Van Outrive et al. (1992, p. 47) ; Keunings et al. (2004) ; Denys (2010).
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markets, parades and public celebrations like carnival processions, and to maintain 
public order at both day and night, cities often appealed to low-paid watchmen and 
fire brigades.28 However, the modernisation and professionalisation of the municipal 
police saw this patchwork of policing services slowly disappearing, with most of the 
auxiliary forces, among them local urban night-watch services, being incorporated 
into regular police units.29 This modernisation strategy was not surprising : the 
local police found itself increasingly  confronted with new public order challenges, 
including major increase in traffic, overcrowded neighbourhoods, forms of anti-
social behaviour and a better-armed, professional and mobile criminal underworld.30
As part of this modernisation, a port police unit, a criminal investigation 
department and a vice squad were added to the local police force in Antwerp, 
bringing its numbers up to 835 police officers in 1910.31 Notwithstanding the process 
of gradually merging auxiliary police services into the public law enforcement 
agencies, privatised forms of policing never  completely disappeared, with various 
players remaining active in the security market. Nonetheless, as discussed below, a 
new, modern private security industry started to emerge in the early twentieth century. 
In 1910, for example, the city of Antwerp already counted 439 night watchmen, the 
majority employed by the night watch service Waak en Sluit32. In  comparison to their 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century predecessors, when night-watches  consisted 
mostly of unskilled workers,33 these security  companies reflected the professional 
characteristics of the public police in terms of their hierarchical organisation, strict 
recruitment of personnel (at least in theory), the use of uniforms and to some degree 
their policing activities, but differed from it in their accountability,  commercial 
interests and the absence of any legal framework. In this respect, the private security 
industry aroused new questions about responsibility for maintaining public order 
and the nature and objects of policing itself.34
THE ‘WAAK EN SLUIT’ PRIVATE NIGHT WATCH SERVICE
Origin and background
The Belgian Waak en Sluit night watch service was established in 1907 as a 
subsidiary of the Kölner Wach- und Schließgesellschaft (KWS), copying its classic 
German hierarchical and military characteristics. KWS founder Benno Koßmann had 
incorporated KWS in Cologne on 1 December 1901. Only six months earlier, on 15 July 
1901, the first night watch service in Germany and even Europe had been founded in 
Hanover by a German businessman : the Hannoversches Wach- und Schließinstitut 
(HWS), later named Niedersächsischen Wach- und Schließgesellschaft, modelled 
on US private security firms, and in particular the Pinkerton National Detective 
28 Keunings (1983, p. 150).
29 Keunings (2009, pp. 22-24).
30 Keunings (2009, p. 63) ; De Koster (2011, p. 258).
31 Van Outrive et al. (1992, p. 76).
32 Keunings (2009, p. 66).
33 Meershoek (2007, p. 88).
34 Shearing, Stenning (1987, p. 10).
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Agency.35 Apart from providing detective services, the latter included a night-watch 
division, established in Chicago in 1858 as the Protective Police Patrol. This private 
policing body offered urban night protection in Chicago for  commercial enterprises 
such as banks, offices and stores. During the 1880s, it was however primarily used 
as a strike-breaking force in the hands of industrial employers,36 a practice that will 
be briefly discussed later in this article. The idea of a uniformed and paid guard 
service to prevent crime at night certainly proved successful in Germany and the rest 
of Europe, as witnessed by the  considerable rise in the number of private security 
 companies between 1901 and 1904. The plethora of initially similar night watch 
services were united under the umbrella of the Kölner Verband in 1904. A year later 
the Kölner Wach- und Schließgesellschaften provided forms of private security in 
almost fifty cities throughout Germany and Europe, including Hamburg, Frankfurt, 
Berlin, Dresden, Prague and Vienna. By 1906 KWS already employed more than 
1500 security guards.37
It is quite remarkable how the security industry began to develop in neighbouring 
countries in the early twentieth century. For example in the Netherlands, where 
in 1902 the first private night watch service, the Gecontroleerde Particuliere 
Nachtveiligheid, whose organisation and structure were based on the German Wach- 
und Schließgesellschaften, was established in Amsterdam by Isaac Beuth.38 In France, 
the widespread perception of lack of safety and security in the suburbs – which was 
to a certain degree fuelled by the press and public fascination by sensational criminal 
cases,39 – led to the creation of several private security services in 1907, that paved 
the way for a booming industry until the outbreak of the First World War40. Somewhat 
later,  Belgium’s modern-day private security industry emerged near the city centre 
of Antwerp with the founding of Waak en Sluit on 1 March 190741. One year later, 
on 22 March 1908, a similar firm started up in Brussels under the name of La Ronde 
de Nuit,42 and both  companies joined the Internationaler Verband der Wach- und 
Schließgesellschaften in 1910.43 Nevertheless, as we have to point out, private and 
local night watches were of course no exclusive phenomenon of the second half of 
the Belle Époque. Instead, predecessors date back as far as ancient times and the 
nocturnal practice  continued to exist throughout history,44 one famous example being 
De Nachtwacht or The Night Watch, immortalized by Rembrandt van Rijn in 1642. 
In Belgium by the end of the nineteenth century, for example, there existed other 
private night watches, but most of them were quite unsuccessful, disappeared after 
a few years and had no significant influence on future developments in policing.45
35 Nelken (1926, p. 56).
36 Morn (1982, pp. 89-90).
37 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, Correspondence Kölner Wach- und Schließgesellschaft 
to KVKA, 16 August 1906.
38 Verhoog (2002, p. 20).
39 Kalifa (1995, pp. 238-243 ; 2000, p. 117).
40 Ocqueteau (1992, p. 65) ; Kalifa (2000, pp. 134-136).
41 Attachments Belgian official journal, 18 and 19 March 1907, act 1296, p. 1033.
42 Keunings (1982, p. 102).
43 Nelken (1926, p. 86).
44 Versteeg (1925) ; Lipson (1988) ; Denys (2010).
45 Keunings (1982, 1996).
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Just eighteen months after its establishment, the newspaper  L’Étoile belge 
reported on 30 August 1908 that Waak en Sluit had more than 2000 customers.46 
While both Waak en Sluit and La Ronde de Nuit successfully expanded their private 
policing activities during their early years,47 things changed from August 1914 
onwards. Although precise data on Waak en Sluit are scarce due to a lack of historical 
sources, the logical  conclusion must be that the outbreak of the First World War 
disrupted everyday operations. In Germany, for example, private firms associated 
to the KWS – and we have good reason to believe this was the case in Belgium 
too – suffered from a lack of personnel.48 Nevertheless, private KWS-watchmen 
in Germany could be found guarding vital locations such as factories, water, gas 
and electricity corporations and arms depots.49 In Belgium, by  contrast, security 
activities  contracted from La Ronde de Nuit and probably Waak en Sluit too were 
put on hold, at least at the beginning of the war. In Brussels, the director of La 
Ronde de Nuit informed the German head office as early as October 1914 that the 
 company was  completely shut down on account of the ongoing military activities,50 
though, according to Keunings, it was back operating in January 1915.51 Comparable 
developments also took place in Paris, according to Ocqueteau, where night-watch 
services practically ceased to exist until the end of the war, although this is disputed 
by Kalifa.52 Nevertheless, private local night-watch initiatives emerged between 1914 
and 1918, though differing in their nature and goals from the  commercial enterprises 
discussed in this article. In essence, the German-occupied Belgian mainland was 
policed, alongside the German forces, by remaining municipal police officers and 
agents – usually older men – and temporary local night watches and civic guards. 
Their tasks included the enforcement of wartime regulations on food supplies, the 
search for subversive elements and deserters trying to escape military service and 
front-line duty.53 With regard to the incipient Belgian private security industry itself, 
things were slightly different. Research, for example, has revealed that business 
activity in Belgium declined more than half during the war.54 This financial and 
economic crisis undoubtedly affected and reduced the purchasing power of even 
wealthier citizens, merchants and industrial magnates, i.e. the socio-economic groups 
the private security sector depended on. In this respect, it is not surprising that even 
at times when property crime and feelings of insecurity increased, a large number 
of Waak en Sluit  contracts were probably cancelled, although new empirical data 
might prove otherwise. We know, however, that the  company resumed operations 
after the war,  continuing until 1956, when the guard division was taken over by the 
later-discussed Garde Maritime & Commerciale.
However, societal shifts during the interwar period almost saw the early end of 
private security firms in Belgium. As a result of international developments, existing 
46 Keunings (1982, p. 137).
47 Keunings (1982, p. 106 ; 1996, p. 11).
48 Nelken (1926, p. 99).
49 Nelken (1926, p. 112).
50 Nelken (1926, p. 105).
51 Keunings (1982, pp. 106-111).
52 See Ocqueteau (1992, p. 65) ; Kalifa (2000, p. 229).
53 Emsley (2007, p. 247).
54 Scholliers (1978, pp. 335-336).
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political tension between left- and right-wing extremist movements increased to 
such a level that they threatened public order. Violent and even fatal  confrontations 
between fascist and  communist militias forced the government to take legislative 
action prohibiting private militias. With the passing of the bill on 29 July 1934, the 
first private security legislation was adopted. The Law Prohibiting Private Militias, 
recast in 1936, also applied to the Belgian private security industry, up to then 
operating in a legal vacuum. Due to the strict regulations applying to uniformed and 
armed organisations, the  continued existence of private, in this case  commercial, 
security firms became an issue. It took a Royal Decree, initiated by the Ministry 
of the Interior, to exempt uniformed non-political groups working for profit (e.g. 
Waak en Sluit, La Ronde de Nuit, Garde Maritime & Commerciale, etc.) from being 
affected by this Law. 
Activities and organisation
In its early years, the  company’s main activities were described in the 
 commercial register (Handelsregister) as “various security services”.55 This rather 
vague description became more explicit in the light of the objectives stated in the 
Belgian official journal (Belgisch Staatsblad) : “The  company’s main objective is 
the provision of daytime and night-time security services regarding movable and 
immovable property in the city and province of Antwerp, and all  commercial and 
financial operations related directly or indirectly to these services”.56 Although 
the objectives refer to “de jour et de nuit”, Waak en Sluit was primarily a night 
watch service. The provision of stationary or foot patrol guards outside the regular 
hours (10 :00 p.m. till 5 :00 or 6 :00 a.m.) was only allowed in a small number of 
exceptional cases.57 In a detailed catalogue the  company, besides firmly stating “We 
never sleep !”58, declared that the main tasks  consisted of securing property at night 
against burglary, theft, (water) damage and fire, and ensuring that stored goods were 
not stolen or damaged.59 Private night-watch services provided by the Cologne 
association covered a wide range of activities (Table 1), stretching from mere crime 
and loss prevention – locking unlocked doors and windows, removing keys from 
doors, chasing off and capturing burglars and other uninvited guests – to providing 
first aid in case of an accident, inspecting water pipes and shut-off valves, putting 
out lights and candles, etc.
Routine patrols  constituted the most regular security activity. Similar to the 
patrolling done by police officers or agents, the private watchman patrolled his 
assigned district at night, though with the major exception that his policing was 
limited to private and  commercial situation, i.e., exclusively on behalf of paying 
customers. Nonetheless, when  coming across any person in need on the street he 
55 RAB, Commercial register Antwerpen 2004 A, No. 10210, f. 9082.
56 Attachments Belgian official journal, 18 and 19 March 1907, act. 1296, p. 1033 : “La société a pour 
objet la surveillance de jour et de nuit de toutes propriétés mobilières et immobilières situées en 
 Anvers, ou dans la province  d’Anvers et toutes les opérations  commerciales et financières se rat-
tachent directement ou indirectement à des affaires de ce genre”.
57 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. 8).
58 Notice the similarity with  Pinkerton’s “The eye that never sleeps”. 
59 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. 4).
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was obliged to provide first aid, a skill taught during training.60 Waak en Sluit divided 
the city into a number of easy-to-patrol districts, each under the hierarchical  control 
of a supervisor and a few watchmen, the latter initially patrolling on foot, later by 
bicycle. This mere ‘scarecrow function’61 of uniformed watchmen walking the beat, 
regardless of whether they had a public or private remit, was at that time thought 
sufficient to prevent crime. In addition, private night-watch services provided 
customers with enamel membership signs as a deterrent to potential criminals, a 
practice adopted from the Pinkerton Agency62. Visibly mounted next to clients’ doors, 
the words “Société de Surveillance Waak en Sluit” or “Bewaking-Surveillance Waak 
en Sluit” were supposed to act as much as a deterrent as  today’s CCTV or “Beware 
of dogs” signs.
Table 1. Interventions of the Kölner Wach- und Schließgesellschaft (25th October 
1905 – 10th October 1906)63
Intervention Number of interventions %
Open gas taps found 235 0,0
Fires extinguished 239 0,0
Fire warnings 245 0,0
Cracked water pipes found 285 0,0
First aid interventions 310 0,1
Burglars etc. captured 831 0,1
Open water pipes closed 1.273 0,2
Burglars etc. chased away 1.383 0,2
Lost and found objects 1.518 0,3
Assistance in arrest of suspects 1.958 0,3
Removed homeless people from houses 4.649 0,8
Keys found on doors 4.846 0,8
Open factories and warehouses found 8739 1,5
Horses rescued from dangerous situations 8.933 1,5
Open windows closed 18.038 3,1
Extinguished lights 32.844 5,6
Opened closed doors for residents 116.887 19,9
Open doors closed 384.447 65,4
Total 587.660 100,0
60 Ibidem.
61 Reiner (1992, p. 106).
62 Morn (1982, p. 115).
63 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. 29).
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Security guards were forbidden to heed neighbouring premises. Neighbours were 
cautioned in no uncertain terms that the security  company was “not  concerned with 
public security like the police”, but instead provided surveillance and protection 
exclusively to paying customers.64 Indeed, the  company clearly emphasised its 
 commercial background when stating its most substantial difference to the public 
police : its accountability. Instead of providing security to society in general, private 
firms such as Waak en Sluit delivered guard services exclusively to those able or 
willing to pay. Proactive instead of reactive intervention and protection of client 
property thus became two of the most specific features of modern private security 
 companies, or as Shearing and Stenning both noted : “While the preventive role of 
the public police is almost universally referred to in terms of ‘crime prevention’, 
private security typically refer to their preventative role as one of ‘loss prevention’, 
thereby acknowledging that their principal  concern is the protection of their clients’ 
assets”65. In other words, the preventive focus of the private security industry directed 
its actions not so much upon breaches of the law, but rather to the opportunities for 
such breaches.66
The private security industry was  constantly looking for new opportunities to 
expand business. Taking this  commercial point of view into account surely marked a 
shift between  contemporary private night-watch services and former night watches. 
Even so, in general the activities of both systems remained more or less  comparable. 
While watchmen had previously sounded the alarm in cases of certain dangers or fire 
hazards threatening the wood-built neighbourhoods of pre-modern cities, activities 
of night-watch services at the onset of the twentieth century had evolved towards 
the prevention of dangerous urban situations in a broader security sense, though 
of course strictly limited to their clients’ premises. As a result of the previously 
mentioned security issues in the port of Antwerp at the turn of the century, KWS 
 contacted the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce 8 months before establishing their 
Belgian subsidiary in 1907,67 underlining its success in preventing crime and its 
excellent collaboration with the city authorities. It was obvious that KWS had 
studied the possibility of expanding its operations to port security, as also suggested 
by Waak en Sluit in 1910.68 Occasionally the intended business expansion had 
more of a ‘moral’ incentive, as witnessed in the Belgian university city of Leuven, 
where another Waak en Sluit department was established. At the beginning of 1914 
the managing director of the private night-watch service submitted an application 
to the  university’s vice-rector, suggesting that his watchmen should ‘supervise’ 
students during their pub crawls at a cost of 20 Belgian francs (Bfr.) a month. In the 
face of this disciplinary measure, resistance grew among students, who promptly 
organised a protest march demanding the resignation of the managing director and 
the  university’s vice-rector. The application was eventually withdrawn, much to the 
regret of the night-watch  company, as “it could have led to many other wonderful 
64 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, pp. 13-14).
65 Shearing, Stenning (1981, p. 212).
66 Shearing, Stenning (1981, p. 214).
67 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, Correspondence Kölner Wach- und Schließgesellschaft 
to KVKA, 16 August 1906.
68 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. i).
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tasks for the  company at Leuven”.69 The incident was even picked up by the German 
tabloid Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, referring to the  company on 12 March 1914 
as “Die Wach- und Schließgesellschaft als Wächterin der Moral”, the night watch 
service as moral guardian70. 
The Antwerp division proved more successful at performing other services : a 
variety of premises were watched over : private houses, shops, offices, factories 
and stockyards. While clients could always ask for additional hours of protection, 
regular beats started at 10 :00 p.m. and ended at 05 :00 a.m. in summer and 06 :00 
a.m. in winter. On  completing a night patrol, customers were thoroughly briefed 
about the outcome, being informed of doors and windows left open, or even possibly 
of burning candles or extinguished lights that had exposed their property to the 
risk of fire. Two different types of guarding were offered : outside or inside the 
residence.71 Clients choosing the former option were asked to pay 2 Bfr. a month 
for the external inspection of each privately-owned house, 3 Bfr. for a two-door 
property, with 0.5 Bfr. for each additional outside door.72 Owners of larger properties 
were charged up to 20 Bfr. a month, the same price as for shops, banks, hotels, 
factories and other  commercial or industrial buildings with only one entrance and a 
street-facing outside wall. Additional doors and outside walls led to higher prices. 
For a further security round inside the premises – which was only possible for 
clients with an annual subscription – customers were charged an extra 3 to 20 Bfr. a 
month, depending on the size and number of floors and the frequency of nocturnal 
security rounds73. Keys to the premises could be given to Waak en Sluit which then, 
as promised to their clients, “carefully secured the delivered keys” in their main 
office when security staff no longer needed them after their foot patrol.74 Due to the 
costs involved in the private protection of property and life, it is needless to say that 
many security  contracts  concerned the nocturnal safeguarding of shops, museums, 
art galleries, banks, offices and industrial sites, alongside the homes of the well-to-
do. In Brussels, La Ronde de Nuit also protected foreign embassies75. Compared to 
the industrial policing by the Pinkerton Agency on behalf of corporations, no direct 
historical evidence is found of the use of Waak en Sluit-guards as privately owned 
strike-breakers. The  company did however offer factory owners protection of their 
property, underlining the “advantages  compared to in-house security guards”.76
With regard to the modus operandi, organisation and use of emblems and uniforms, 
Waak en Sluit adopted the well-known militaristic, hierarchical and bureaucratic 
model of the Wach- und Schließgesellschaft, itself based on the dominant structural 
characteristics of the German (i.e. Prussian) public police model. Beneath the 
69 Nelken (1926, p. 471) : “noch viele andere schöne Aufgaben hätte man für die Loewener Schließge-
sellschaft finden können”.
70 Nelken (1926, p. 470).
71 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. 9).
72 To give some  context to these prices : in some industries in Belgium around 1900, average wages 
for labourers were sometimes as low as 10 Bfr. per week. An average of approximately 85 % of their 
income was spent on nourishment ; Scholliers (1981, p. 288) ; Deneckere (2006, p. 23).
73 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, pp. 30-31).
74 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. 12).
75 Keunings (1982).
76 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, pp. 13-14).
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managing director, a team of (head)supervisors ((hoofd)toezichters) helped manage 
the enterprise. At the lower levels, a foreman (opziener) gave the watchmen or 
 constables their instructions and inspected them at regular intervals during patrols. 
The  company repeatedly stressed its professional and proficient background and 
working methods, mainly in an attempt to counter the negative reputation of the 
private security sector. In one of the  commercial publications distributed by Waak en 
Sluit, the enterprise stated that all its staff possessed certificates of good character, 
had served in the military and came from a respectable background77. From a 
historical and  commercial point of view, there were good reasons for doing so. In 
general, former watchmen, private law enforcers and other private organisations 
policing individuals and property suffered from a bad image. As research shows, 
thief-takers frequently had quite an interest in the criminal economy themselves as a 
way of arranging their ‘legal’ business,78 while watchmen were in close touch with 
suspicious figures and parties because of their nocturnal policing activities. During 
the nineteenth century, the business of private watchmen included guiding ‘night 
owls’ to the local brothels, where in return they were given a small fee for their 
helpful but doubtful  contributions – a source of income not to be underestimated.79 
But most likely Waak en Sluit feared that public opinion would  compare their 
watchmen to the infamous ‘Pinkertons’, as the Pinkerton Agency guards were called. 
Several incidents relating to clashes between Pinkerton security guards – many of 
them having a criminal record – and strikers had given the agency in the United 
States a bad name, even to the extent that they were called “the scum of the earth” 
by some.80
THE ‘GARDE MARITIME & COMMERCIALE’ PRIVATE
SECURITY  COMPANY
Origin and background
The seaport of Antwerp, with its well-established trade and business circles, 
played a major part in the genesis of the Garde Maritime & Commerciale (GMC). 
The  port’s specific setting  concentrated vast numbers of people and goods within 
an urban space that was to a large extent managed by private enterprises. This gave 
rise to various opportunities of crime on the one hand and crime  control on the 
other. Throughout history, the structural growth of  commercial maritime sites had 
boosted unique port security issues and the creation of various forms of public and 
private ‘dock policing’ bodies.81 One example is the formation of the Thames River 
Police in the late 1790s by merchant and magistrate Patrick Colquhoun. This was 
a private police force – although later made public – set up under his authority to 
protect his docks and warehouses against theft and pilfering, crimes that often went 
77 Maatschappij van bewaking ‘Waak en Sluit’ (1910, p. 6).
78 Spitzer, Scull (1977, p. 20) ; Lea (2002, p. 34).
79 Verhoog (2002).
80 Morn (1982, p. 104). 
81 Emsley (2010) ; Tobias (1967, p. 34) ; Godfrey, Cox (2013, p. 106).
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hand-in-hand with the growth of  commercial activities82. A century later, similar 
developments took place in the port of Antwerp, where the enormous rise in trading 
activities and the  port’s infrastructure expansion since 1860 led to new organisational 
 concerns requiring clear-cut port policies.
Until the mid-nineteenth century, the loss of goods and cargo as a result of theft 
were still negligible and acceptable from an economic point of view83. Wharf security 
was organised by several logistic corporations known as ‘naties’ or warehousing 
 companies, e.g. Zuidnatie, Tabaknatie and Katoennatie, each responsible for a 
specific type of merchandise. Most of them belonged to the umbrella organisation, 
Bond der Vereenigde Natiën84. Every warehouse  company was responsible for the 
temporary storage of the goods unloaded from a ship. However, with the  port’s 
structural expansion and the massive increase in transported merchandise towards 
the end of the century, these  companies were no longer able to fulfil their security 
obligations, as witnessed by a substantial rise in theft and pilfering on the wharves 
and in the warehouses. As a  consequence, the warehouse and shipping  companies 
and agencies became increasingly  concerned about the situation, until in the end 
they took on the local authorities. As early as 1888 different maritime corporations 
accused the Antwerp mayor Léopold De Wael of ignoring port security, stating that 
it was almost a “rarity to  come across a police agent when strolling around the 
docks”.85 Over the next few decades, tensions  continued to develop between port 
organisations and the Antwerp local authorities over crime in port area and crime 
 control. While business  companies criticized the lack of support from the municipal 
police, the authorities met these accusations by pointing to the  companies’ own 
responsibility for the problem by stockpiling goods in such a visible and unprotected 
ways, which  constituted a “ constant lure for thieves”.86 In addition, Léopold De Wael 
placed blame on the port  companies, as their in-house security services  consisted 
mainly of older watchmen, physically incapable of deterring thieves, who in turn did 
not shrink from throwing the guards into the docks when caught in the act. 87
Several associations participated in finding solutions for the problems of theft 
in the  port’s warehouses and quays. From 1888 onwards, the Bond der Vereenigde 
Natiën, the Antwerp Chamber of Commerce and the Antwerp authorities began 
negotiations about the creation of a watchmen service. Two years later the 
Handelswaakdienst, “a specialised watchmen service for safeguarding docks and 
ships in the port of Antwerp at night”88, was established. The organisation was under 
 control of the Antwerp local authorities, the police and the Chamber of Commerce,89 
although it resembled a hybrid police service  comparable to the Thames River 
Police.90 Though the manned guard service earned a few minor successes in 
82 Lea (2002, p. 33) ; Filtness (2014, p. 37).
83 Asaert et al. (1993, p. 210).
84 Confederation of United Warehouse Companies.
85 AKVBG, Minute book VBG, 6 January 1888.
86 AKVBG, Minute book VBG, 20 January 1888.
87 AKVBG, Minute book VBG, 7 March 1888.
88 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3687, Document Handelswaakdienst, 1907.
89 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, report KVKA  concerning Handelswaakdienst, 
30 November 1905, p. 1.
90 George, Button (2004, p. 20).
THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN ANTWERP (1907-1934) 133
preventing pilfering and plundering, the lack of (night) watchmen forced even the 
director of the Handelswaakdienst to admit that “hugh amounts of merchandise 
remained unguarded”,91 as illustrated by the following cases of theft in 1905. In 
the night of 6 June, 15 sacks of coffee beans were pilfered from the German ship 
Vereinigung 50. The shipping agent, W. H. Müller & Co claimed they could only 
leave their merchandise unprotected on the wharves for two days before they were 
stolen92. Due to theft, the maritime  company Boutmy & Co lost two crates of milk 
and two pallets of paint on 2 and 4 December 1905.93 Shipbroker Selb & Huverstuh 
sent a list of goods stolen between 18 September and 20 November to the Antwerp 
Chamber of Commerce. In two of their warehouses more than 28 crates  containing 
matches and 2 crates each of candles, lanterns, glassware, milk and cognac and 1 
crate of chains were stolen.94 Between 5 August and 9 November, the Compagnie de 
Transports Internationaux lost 26 sacks of wood pulp, 8 barrels of oil, 1 crate full of 
iron scrap and 8 lamps from another crate95. The wave of theft did not go unnoticed 
outside the port either. The newspaper Handelsblad reported on the security issues, 
writing that “Our port seems to be in the hand of thieves”.96 Alongside some minor 
incidents of theft, the article also mentioned the theft of 30 tons of wheat by so-called 
‘river thieves on the Scheldt’. Even the international press raised critical questions 
on the matter, with the widely-read shipping newspaper The Syren and Shipping 
listing several ‘delinquent ports’ worldwide, including the port of Antwerp, where 
“a ship has to be most carefully watched, as petty thieving is rife”.97 Throughout this 
research, hundreds of examples of port theft were discovered, while probably a great 
deal of theft was not even noticed or reported to the authorities. But not everyone 
was  convinced of the increase in theft. A number of shipping agencies argued that 
some of the missing goods that appeared to be stolen were in reality lost due to 
careless processing or handling on the wharves and in the warehouses.98 Finally, this 
long-term security vacuum encouraged Aloïs Laurens, with financial support from 
major shipping  companies and agencies, to establish the joint-stock  company Garde 
Maritime & Commerciale (GMC), on 18 April 1907.99
91 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, Chambre de Commerce  d’Anvers : Sécurité des Mar-
chandises sur les Quais. Enquête faite par le Comité Central. Rapport général du bureau, 31 March 
1906, p. 2.
92 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, Correspondence W. H. Müller & Co to KVKA, 24 No-
vember 1905.
93 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3687, Correspondence Boutmy & Co to KVKA., 8 December 
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KVKA, 14 December 1905.
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Activities and organisation
Between the year of its foundation and 1910,  GMC’s main activity  consisted 
of safeguarding  commercial goods and other cargo that was stored in warehouses, 
waiting to be loaded onto cargo ships or freight wagons. Describing itself as a 
“Société de surveillance pour le port  d’Anvers”, its activities took place exclusively 
in the port of Antwerp. The purpose of the private security  company was “to organise 
a security service for the port of Antwerp, as well as for the monitoring of work 
activities, the surveillance of movable and immovable property, and other, similar 
activities, with or without theft liability during the surveillance”.100 After a couple of 
years, most notably from 1910 onwards, the  company extended its services beyond 
the warehouses, keeping watch of ships and their cargoes in an attempt to put an 
end to the most inventive thieves, who were using small boats to steal cargoes from 
ships. This practice may have been more  common than generally assumed, with 
several indications suggesting that a large number of crimes against property in the 
port of Antwerp were  committed by ‘river thieves’.101
 GMC’s working methods differed from a typical night-watch service, with 
security rounds performed both day and night and lasting twelve instead of six hours. 
A regular security round  commenced at noon and ended at midnight, or vice versa.102 
At a  client’s request a ‘demi-veille’ or reduced service from 6 :00 a.m. till 12 :00 p.m. 
or from 12 :00 p.m. till 18 :00 p.m. was also possible. This  contractual flexibility 
offered a great advantage to maritime entrepreneurs, as demand for protection 
greatly depended upon  continually changing levels of  commercial activity. 
A few years after  GMC’s establishment, the  company reported that, thanks to their 
specialisation and experience in the field of private crime  control, theft of property 
and  complaints related to crime had declined significantly in the Belgian seaport.103 
In an attempt to polish the image of the private security industry in general, and 
their own in particular, GMC advertised themselves as a professional enterprise, 
protecting the interests of their many clients. In addition, security guards employed 
by the Antwerp private security  company were claimed to be “strictly inspected” 
during their service.104 As mentioned above, the First World War greatly impacted 
on  commercial activities in the port of Antwerp. Because of the  company’s close 
interdependence with the port, it was forced to suspend security services during the 
First World War,105 only to restart operations soon after the end of the war.106
100 Belgian official journal, 18 April 1907, Act. 2724, Chapter I, art. 2 : “ l’organisation  d’un service de 
veilles pour le port  d’Anvers, ainsi que pour la surveillance de travaux, garde des propriétés, mobi-
lières et immobilières et autres opérations similaires avec ou sans responsabilité  contre vols, durant 
la surveillance”.
101 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, Correspondence E. Karcher & Co to KVKA, 17 No-
vember 1905 ; RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3688, Correspondence Louis Gutjahr to KVKA, 
29 November 1905.
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104 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 3687, Correspondence Garde Maritime & Commerciale to 
KVKA, 21 November 1910.
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With industrial and maritime activities in the port of Antwerp slowly regaining 
momentum after the  conflict ended, GMC started searching for new customers and 
markets outside the port. With the creation of its subsidiary Nachtronde in 1919, 
a night-watch service similar to Waak en Sluit, GMC expanded its business scope 
and private security activities to the whole of Antwerp.107 From then on, owners of 
private houses, villas, shops and warehouses outside the port could turn to  GMC’s 
nocturnal security guards when looking for private protection. The  company declared 
the formation of Nachtronde was a necessity to “[…]better safeguard houses and 
private property in the then existing atmosphere of insecurity and increasing number 
of burglaries”.108 Indeed, recent research on criminal activity in Belgium during and 
immediately after the war shows that theft was the most important form of crime 
during that period.109 The rise in armed and violent burglaries in particular, although 
representing only a very small percentage of total thefts, resulted in growing 
fears among rural, but to a certain extent also urban, populations. This situation 
was aggravated by the authorities’ inability to maintain law and order in the first 
year following the war. The immediate cause was the ongoing re-establishment of 
the gendarmerie and the municipal police to their full strength. But it seems that 
 commercial incentives also inspired GMC to serve private interests. Until at least 
the early 1920s, Waak en Sluit in Antwerp and La Ronde de Nuit in Brussels were 
successfully monopolising the nocturnal urban security market. As already mentioned, 
both night-watch services included numerous high-profile people and businesses on 
their client list. Given the success of GMC in the port of Antwerp, it was not surprising 
that the  company tried to find new  commercial opportunities on the territory of 
Waak en Sluit. Other, more patriotic stimuli may have accelerated the formation of 
the subsidiary. After the establishment of Nachtronde, a noteworthy statement was 
made by GMC, saying that the Belgian citizens could now “disentangle themselves 
from foreign associations, which pretend to be Belgian without any proof”.110 
Although no  company was named specifically, it seems plausible that GMC referred 
to Waak en Sluit and the  company’s German origin. In an attempt to improve and 
promote its general maritime interests, further  contacts were made between GMC, 
the Committee of Antwerp port Interests and the International Shipping Federation 
in 1928, emphasizing the important position of the private security  company as a 
partner. Later on, the  company changed its name to Garde Maritime, Industrielle & 
Commerciale (GMIC) or Scheepvaart, Nijverheids- en Handelswacht. Several other 
establishments, including Shipping & Signalling Services and  Dekker’s Controlled 
Harbour Surveillance, were incorporated in the years to  come. Ultimately, even 
the Waak en Sluit night-watch services – and thousands of its customers – were 
taken over by GMIC in 1953, with the latter stating that the takeover was “greatly 
appreciated by citizens of residential areas”111. 
Little is known today about the preventive outcome of  GMC’s services. In its 
 commercial brochures, the  company underlined its major role in pushing down 
theft rates in the port of Antwerp. However, nearly a quarter of a century after its 
107 Garde Maritime & Commerciale SA, Guide-Poche Maritime 1931 (1931, p. 7).
108 GMIC 70 Antwerpen, Lloyd (1979, s.p.).
109 Leloup, Rousseaux, Vrints (2014).
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foundation, various maritime and economic interest organisations criticized  GMC’s 
lack of professionalism and limited efficiency in reducing crime rates, as illustrated 
by the plentiful correspondence between the opposing parties characterising the 
underlying security issues in the port of Antwerp. While the public authorities had 
in 1888 questioned the capabilities and age of warehousing  companies’ in-house 
guards, the director of the Antwerp Shipping Federation similarly questioned the 
effectiveness of GMC security guards decades later.112 In response to these allegations, 
Paul De Leeuw, an agent of the Northern Shipowners Association and related to the 
GMC, countered the criticism by pointing out that the security  company had not 
received a single  complaint from any customer with regards to stolen goods, careless 
surveillance, etc.113 However, Cléomir Jussiant, president of the Antwerp Chamber of 
Commerce in 1933, responded in no uncertain terms “que les intéressés [customers 
of the GMC] ayant déjà  conclu que les critiques  n’amenaient aucune amélioration, il 
était inutile de persister dans cette voie”.114 Though such debates between the various 
maritime parties are illuminating, at the end of the day it is difficult to arrive at any 
solid  conclusions. The GMC and other guard services such as Waak en Sluit that 
started up operations in the port of Antwerp in the second half of the interwar period 
certainly received support from different persons and organisations115. On the other 
hand, a lot of criticism was levelled by other maritime groups, mostly  concerning the 
inefficiency of hired security personnel, or their long criminal records116.
THE GROWTH OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY
In this article we have described the structure and activities of two of the first 
private security  companies in Belgium. In this last section, we will outline a number 
of fundamental political, socio-economic and socio- cultural trends in which issues 
related to crime and crime  control have enhanced privatised responses to insecurity. 
Looking at the rise and expansion of private night-watch services in different European 
countries in the early twentieth century, similar developments can be identified. In 
many larger cities in industrialised Western countries, debates on urban night-time 
security – or the lack thereof – gained momentum in the late nineteenth century, 
despite state efforts to institutionalise its perceived monopoly in crime  control. 
Guided by motives ranging from the dissemination of information to sensationalism, 
the printed press pointed to the dangerousness of society in general, and cities in 
particular. In cities like Paris and London, newspapers started reporting about unsafe 
urban  conditions at night due to inadequate public ‘night police’, hinting at the 
need to re-establish the old night watch services to guarantee the necessary levels 
112 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 355, Correspondence F.M.A.-A.S.V. to KVKA, 28 July 1933.
113 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 355, Correspondence P. De Leeuw to KVKA, 12 August 1933.
114 RAB, KVK ANTW 2003 (B128), No. 355, Correspondence C. Jussiant to P. De Leeuw, 19 August 
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of security.117 In Germany,  complaints about the public  police’s failure to ensure 
protection during the night aroused nostalgic images among its citizens of the former 
night watchman as “ein Stück verlonerer Poesie”.118 In Belgium too, critical analyses 
of urban insecurity and the inefficient police system could be found in the press. In 
Brussels for example, the local police was under heavy fire as a result of a number 
of unsolved murders between 1901 and 1907.119 In addition, the  city’s inhabitants 
witnessed a huge increase in police-reported property crime at night.120 Newspaper 
stories about dangerous French and German gangs of thieves fuelled moral panic. In 
general, the overall image of Belgium was that of a dangerous country. According 
to the  contemporary sociologist Henri Joly, the statistical increase of crime rates in 
Belgium in general and in the larger cities of Brussels and Antwerp in particular 
was direct proof of the immoral nature of the Belgian population and its violent 
and alcohol-abusing ‘classes dangereuses’.121 Henceforth, the myth of ‘la Belgique 
criminelle’ was born. When searching for explanations of the burgeoning private 
security industry, the historical impact of such  continual journalistic attention to 
crime and insecurity should not be underestimated, certainly not in an era when the 
distribution of newspapers flourished and news reached a far wider audience than 
previously.122.
Concerns about the organisation and practice of public law enforcement bodies 
further accelerated the birth of the private security industry. In Antwerp, the public 
police was to a great extent occupied with non-criminal aspects of everyday life.123 
Recent research has revealed that the share of criminal offences in the police reports 
between 1890 and 1913 dropped significantly from 50 to 35 percent, while the  police’s 
core activities developed towards  conflict management and the dissemination of 
information.124 In this respect, daily policing duties had a service-related, rather than 
a crime-related, approach. This might  come as a surprise, as crime rates tend to be 
higher in port cities.125 Apart from selective police action, issues related to local staff 
capacities in certain districts of the city, like the ‘Tweede Wijk’ or Second District,126 
also raised questions about the supposed nocturnal regulatory power of the Antwerp 
police. As mentioned above, an emerging group of citizens in search of nightlife and 
entertainment put increasing pressure on public law enforcement bodies at the turn 
of the century.127 Since the Second District  concentrated cafés, theatres, cinemas 
and brothels, a great deal of the Antwerp nightlife and its associated crime occurred 
within this specific urban area. But as literature on the subject shows, (public) 
policing responses to night-time security in the larger cities proved insufficient 
117 Schlör (1998, p. 89).
118 Nelken (1926, p. 55).
119 Keunings (1996, pp. 6-7).
120 Keunings (1982, p. 171).
121 Joly (1907).
122 Kalifa (1995, pp. 238-243).
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125 Johnson (1995, p. 171).
126 De Koster (2011, p. 261).
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around the turn of the twentieth century128. On top of the quantitative and qualitative 
difficulties the local police suffered from, which are defined below, wealthy citizens 
and establishment owners were thus turning to private law enforcement firms (e.g. 
Waak en Sluit) in an attempt to deal with nocturnal threats to their property.
In addition, the crisis in public finances intensified the – to a certain extent 
unintended – retreat of the police from certain areas of the private domain. This 
is clearly illustrated by the disputes over ongoing security matters in the port of 
Antwerp, where the authorities’ acknowledgment of their failure to increase the 
number of police  constables at the docks was in essence due to insufficient financial 
resources.129 This, in turn, intensified the security vacuum that was becoming more 
and more apparent in the port, resulting in several interest groups turning to the 
private sector.130 In the  city’s urban districts too, police surveillance and patrols 
were strategically kept to a minimum and restricted to the prosperous streets and 
neighbourhoods, due to the lack of personnel.131 Similar budgetary problems in 
Brussels at the end of the nineteenth century had hampered the formation of a public 
night-watch service as desired by its Mayor, Karel Buls.132
Other factors need to be taken into  consideration, in addition to feelings of 
insecurity and issues related to the system of public law enforcement. In particular, 
the specific setting of the city and the port of Antwerp, certain circumstances 
triggered the foundation of GMC. In modern cities like Antwerp, economic and 
 commercial trends certainly  contributed to the burgeoning private security sector. 
The intensification of international trade, the  complex structural growth of industrial 
and  commercial enterprises and the expansion of ‘mass private property’133 like 
department stores created new demands for specialised forms of security and 
surveillance.134 In essence, the state gradually lost power and  control over the public 
sphere as a result of the increase in the areas which came under the private  control of 
large corporations. In the port of Antwerp this was also the case – but to a much higher 
degree. On account of its maritime activities, shipping agencies and organisations, 
banking sector, stock markets and insurance business, Antwerp was known as one of 
the largest European trading metropolises.135 The busy economic environment with 
its uninterrupted flow of goods and people was the criminogenic seedbed behind 
the  port’s security issue. Thousands of low-paid dockworkers, allegedly responsible 
for most of the thefts,136 worked daily in and on the unguarded wharves, ships and 
warehouses filled with tons of easy-to-pilfer merchandise. This  convergence of 
128 Keunings (1982, pp. 97-102) ; Schlör (1998, pp. 86-91).
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likely offenders and suitable targets, alongside the absence of capable guardians 
(state police or security staff),137 serves as a theoretical explanation of why the high 
theft rates remained  constant or at least did not decline.
The economic approach to crime and crime  control in the port of Antwerp can 
also be seen in terms of loss prevention and early forms of modern risk management. 
New ways of thinking about cost-benefit security arrangements and analyses may 
have been, as Garland states, primarily developed within the private security industry 
itself ;138 they have certainly also  contributed to the sectors’ own development. 
Within this article it would take us too far to discuss the extensive historical evidence 
on this matter, though a wide range of correspondence between maritime interest 
parties supports these findings.139 Even at a time when crime was mostly seen as 
a “product of degeneracy or pathology”,140 in the port of Antwerp the analysis of 
crime and crime  control was to a large extent economically motivated around the 
turn of the century. This rational thinking in terms of risk reduction and situational 
crime prevention appears to have  contributed greatly to the emergence of the modern 
private security sector. Finally, the insurance sector also played a major role, putting 
further pressure on maritime corporations in the port of Antwerp in the late 1920s. 
In an attempt to lower the financial risks, insurers advised their  commercial clients 
to upgrade surveillance of their goods. In the case of merchandise remaining 
unguarded or crime prevention measures being insufficient, insurance  companies 
refused to cover losses, a practice their clients were well aware of.141 Therefore, from 
a historical perspective, the industrial and  commercial sector played a major role 
in promoting the growth of the modern private security industry. Maritime interest 
groups of merchants, shipping agencies, traders, etc. took matters into their own 
hands when public action failed to materialise and established GMC. As a matter 
of fact, the same developments had been seen decades earlier in the United States 
of America, when in April 1883 seventeen small jewellery stores united to form the 
Jewelers’ Security Alliance, supported by the Pinkerton Agency.142
Reviewing the activities of the Pinkerton Agency, especially with regard to 
strikes, we can ask whether the GMC was used for the same purposes. In the face of 
growing societal and labour unrest in the United States, due to the increasing power of 
workers’ movements, employers and patrons appealed to private detective agencies 
and associated strike-breakers. The emergence of large-scale primary industries 
during the second half of the nineteenth century and the associated increasing 
numbers of unskilled labourers and subsequent strikes promoted the search for law-
and-order enforcement by private organisations like the Pinkerton Agency143. At the 
137 Cohen, Felson (1979, p. 589).
138 Garland (2001, pp. 160-161).
139 AKVBG, Record of proceedings VBG, 22 May 1885 ; RAB, KVK ANTW. 2003 (B128), No. 3688, 
Correspondence chairman tobacco industry to KVKA, 20 November 1905 ; RAB, KVK ANTW. 
2003 (B128), No. 3688, Correspondence KVKA to Minister of Railroad Transport, Maritime Affairs, 
Post Office and Telegraph, 25 August 1919.
140 Zedner (2006, p. 84).
141 RAB, AASV, No. 207, vols au port et service sanitaire, Document Comité des Intérêts Maritimes 
Anversois, 27 February 1929.
142 Morn (1982, p. 114).
143 Spitzer, Scull (1977).
140 PIETER LELOUP
turn of the twentieth century, several strikes hit the port of Antwerp. It is worth 
noting that GMC was established after a few of these severe dock strikes, though no 
direct relationship with these developments can be detected. Up to now, and in the 
 context of this exploratory study, no empirical evidence has been found in support 
of this theory. Nevertheless, further research on the history process of disciplinary 
workforce  control in the coalmining (e.g. Union Minière) and steel industry, or other 
primary industries in Belgium, may reveal useful new insights.
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN PRIVATE SECURITY
AND THE STATE POLICE
It seems that the extent to which the authorities were open to early forms of 
public-private police cooperation depended largely upon the governing parties’ 
perceptions of privatisation within the criminal justice system. In the bigger cities 
in general, the authorities recognized the  contribution private firms could make in 
the field of policing.144 While there are almost no primary sources providing us with 
information on public-private cooperation between 1907 and 1934, the scarce data 
available do suggest that both Waak en Sluit and GMC were  considered valuable 
partners by the authorities and state police in Antwerp in the first years after the 
Second World War, while other, smaller or foreign security firms seemed to avoid 
any police interference.145 GMC in particular, the largest and, according to the 
judicial police, the most trustworthy of the security  companies active in the port 
of Antwerp, provided the state police agencies with useful information on criminal 
offences occurring in and around the port. Waak en Sluit was similarly accepted as a 
private partner in the prevention of nocturnal crime.146 These findings correlate to a 
certain extent with the theoretical explanations put forward by Kakalik and Wildhorn 
in their well-known RAND report, stating that private security  companies act as 
“junior partners in law enforcement, who fill gaps and take up the slack left by the 
public police”.147 In  contrast to the Protective Foot Patrol of the Pinkerton Agency, 
however, little is known about relations between the state- controlled police forces 
and such private security  companies as Waak en Sluit. While in Chicago Mayor John 
Haines even paid for the Protective Foot Patrol as a supplementary police force, it 
is highly doubtful whether a similar practice existed in Antwerp.148 There seems to 
have been a mutual understanding between the Antwerp authorities and the larger 
organisations within the private security sector, but the extent thereof needs to be 
further investigated. While on the other hand La Ronde de Nuit was criticised by 
the public police in Brussels, the Antwerp night-watch service cooperated well with 
its public counterpart. Keunings claims that its guards were even permitted to wear 
a sabre while on patrol,149 although other sources seem to rebut this statement.150 
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The judicial and state police feared that the use or mere carrying of truncheons 
or firearms by private security personnel could pour oil on the fire when dealing, 
for example, with Antwerp dockworkers. In addition to this  concern, the public 
authorities were well aware that granting more wide-ranging policing powers to at 
least one security firm would result in an immediate request from other  companies 
claiming similar privileges.151 Against this background, it is reasonable to assume 
that no private security personnel were ever allowed to wear weapons, as also stated 
by GMC director Jaspers152.
Given the lack of archival sources for the period between 1907 and 1934, little is 
known about the security  companies’ actual policing powers with regard to arresting 
and detaining suspected criminals or other persons caught in the act. Nevertheless, 
information on enforcement measures by KWS security guards in Germany is 
available. One Berlin guard who surprised two burglars in the act on the night of 5 to 
6 December 1905 brought down one of them with his sabre and subsequently handed 
him over to the police.153 On numerous other occasions when security personnel 
caught lawbreakers in the act in German cities, the handling appears similar, albeit 
not so violent.154 In all cases, offenders caught in the act by KWS night watchmen 
were taken to a nearby police station where they were taken into custody. In cases 
where the alarmed police were on site themselves, suspects were handed over to them 
immediately.155 The same applied for GMC, and almost certainly for Waak en Sluit 
as well, as the authorities advised security guards to immediately  contact the port 
police after an offender was caught or a theft noticed.156 Although written in 1947, 
a judicial inquiry  conducted by the public prosecutor, within the  context of the law 
on private militias reveals, that the  company repeatedly asked permission for their 
security personnel to body-search suspected offenders and to carry truncheons,157 
thus illustrating the limited policing powers private guards possessed. Each time, 
the request was refused. Taking this into account, neither Waak en Sluit or GMC 
had the power to arrest or detain suspects, nor to use any kind of weapon or serve 
someone with a summons.158 Under certain circumstances, i.e. when an offender was 
caught in the act, private security guards could resort to ‘lawful  citizen’s arrest’, i.e. 
detain the  culprit preceding his actual arrest by the state police.159 Nevertheless, the 
judicial police stated in the inquiry that the port police was held in greater esteem by 
dockworkers than security personnel in the service of a private  company, above all 
because of its police powers.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article has been to examine the development of the private 
security industry in Antwerp. As we have observed, 1907 marked at least a symbolic 
shift in the nature of private security in Belgium with the establishment of the 
night watch service Waak en Sluit and the first security  company Garde Maritime 
& Commerciale, laying the foundations of  Belgium’s modern-day private security 
industry. As a night watch service, Waak en  Sluit’s main objectives were to protect 
citizens’ property at night against burglary, theft, (water) damage and fire, and to 
watch over stored merchandise. Besides guarding residential houses, security 
guards could be hired to safeguard  commercial establishments,  cultural institutions, 
 commercial offices and industrial sites. In the port of Antwerp, Garde Maritime & 
Commerciale security staff were responsible for guarding goods and merchandise 
left on the wharves or stored in the warehouses. In a later phase, activities were 
expanded to on-board surveillance, as well as patrolling Antwerp residential areas at 
night, in  competition with Waak en Sluit.
In our attempt to provide a preliminary picture of the ‘rent-a-cop’ industry 
in Antwerp, we have distinguished a  complex set of societal  conditions and 
transformations accelerating the growth and expansion of the private security sector. 
Alongside a number of quantitative and qualitative shortcomings of the public 
police, modern societal changes increasingly challenged the criminal justice system 
and its responses to public disorder. Especially in the larger cities such as Antwerp or 
Brussels, the public regulatory bodies were  confronted with new urban phenomena, 
putting a strain on local police departments. A  combination of budgetary issues and 
an increase in disorderly  conduct closely linked to industrialisation and urbanisation 
eventually directed police action towards a more service-oriented approach to 
the detriment of crime  control. However, police-reported crime rates in Belgium 
in general, and in the larger cities in particular, were high in the late nineteenth 
century, with the ‘la Belgique criminelle’ myth being enhanced by press emphasis 
on crime-related topics. In Antwerp, we argue, such developments accelerated the 
growth of the security industry and the foundation of Waak en Sluit, although other, 
more specific driving forces may have  contributed too. Both Waak en Sluit and La 
Ronde de Nuit, for example, were subsidiaries of the larger German Wach- und 
Schließgesellschaften. The remarkable rate at which the night-watch services of the 
Kölner Verband spread throughout Europe by the dawn of the twentieth century is 
indicative of economic and  commercial motives. Moreover, Antwerp was known for 
its economic and trading activities which had created and attracted a lot of prosperous 
citizens. The presence of a wealthy class and a wide range of large estates, shops, 
 commercial businesses and nightlife establishments and a banking and insurance 
industry generated the structural  conditions for the emergence of profit-oriented 
guard services. To a certain extent, the growth and expansion of Garde Maritime & 
Commerciale mirrored that of Waak en Sluit, even though the rationale for founding 
the  companies differed. The empirical data on the origins of GMC is quite clear, with 
decades of security-related issues in the port of Antwerp giving birth to a wide range 
of crime (or loss) prevention measures undertaken by maritime interest groups, 
among them the creation of the Garde Maritime & Commerciale. Nevertheless, 
 commercial motives certainly intensified the expansion of its guard services beyond 
the port of Antwerp, as witnessed by the post-First World War foundation of 
Nachtronde. In  comparison to police officers, private security agents lacked specific 
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policing powers with regard to arrest or detention, and were restrained from carrying 
any type of weapon. However, it seems the Antwerp authorities and state police 
accepted both Waak en Sluit and GMC as partners in crime  control.
To  conclude, we argue that the historical roots of  Belgium’s modern-day private 
security industry can be found in the establishment of a number of private policing 
 companies at the beginning of the twentieth century. Although other private law 
enforcement bodies existed before, organisations like Waak en Sluit and especially 
Garde Maritime & Commerciale, seem to mark at least a symbolic shift in the private 
provision of security, mostly in terms of their activities, professional and  commercial 
characteristics and modi operandi. This article has highlighted the importance of a 
historical perspective to uncover long-term patterns and the predecessors of what 
today is understood as ‘plural policing’. Nevertheless, additional archival research 
on the topic is necessary to identify the exact  conditions shaping the nature of the 
security industry throughout the twentieth century and its sometimes ambiguous 
relationship with other public forms of policing. Only by doing so, and by focusing 
on both historical  continuities and changes, can we fully  comprehend the significance 
and importance of current trends in security and crime  control. 
Pieter Leloup
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